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2 Abstract 
Terrorism has been a key threat to global security. In response to domestic and international 
concerns, China is pushing forward the counter-terrorism efforts in recent years since the new 
leader took office several years ago. Using China as a case study, this project aims to identify 
the risks of China’s counter-terrorism measures under Xi Jinping Administration with 
possible recommendations provided. With the support of scholars’ literatures and reports in 
both English and Chinese, the PEST analysis is used in this paper to thoroughly discuss 4 
aspects, i.e. Political, Economical, Socio-cultural, and Technological regarding China’s 
counter-terrorism measures and the risks associated. Political aspect focuses on China’s 
relations with different international players and other state actors on counter-terrorism issues, 
in view of its more substantial involvement in international affairs as a major power. 
Economical aspect focuses on counter-terrorist-financing. Socio-cultural aspect discusses 
issues related to ethnic identity, control on religion and political discourse, as well as security 
measures at domestic society level.  Technological aspect talks about cyber security, media 
censorship and surveillance technology. It concludes that China as an uprising great power 
and its overseas interests continues to extend, it will become an increasing target for terrorist 
attacks. It needs more substantial involvement under the United Nations framework with 
innovations to overcome the constraints due to the doctrine of non-interference on 
international counter-terrorism cooperation, political willingness and mindset change to 
tackle the root cause of separatism and ethnic issues, determination on law enforcement for 
counter-terrorist-financing, and multilateral and bilateral cooperation with other countries to 
counter cyber terrorism.   
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5 Introduction 
5.1 Current Situation – on International Level 
“Terrorism” is nothing new in modern history. The 2 World Wars had inflamed passions of 
nationalists and the “total war” practices of all combatants in World War II had started the 
thoughts of desensitization of people to violence. After that, in the post-war period, terrorism 
had been a tactical choice by leaders of nationalist insurgencies and revolutions. During the 
Cold War, some leaders like the Soviet Union had adopted the policy of supporting 
revolutionary struggles and their extremists preferred to employ violence and terror to 
achieve their political objectives. The start of modern terrorism can be marked by the 
important incident of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacking the El Al 
flights to Rome, as this was the first time that nationality and its symbolic values were 
stressed explicitly, and this was also the first time that innocent civilians were being used as 
hostages for requests made publicly to a legitimacy. Another important mark for modern 
terrorism is the cooperation of different extremist organizations in launching terrorist attacks. 
This includes the cooperation between Palestinian organizations and Europeans extremists in 
early 1970, where their cooperation ranged from training, operations and even financial 
supports. The most alarming terrorist attack that brought terrorism top on every country’s 
priority list is the crash of United Airlines Flight 175 by hijackers to the South Tower of the 
former World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, i.e. the 9/11 attacks.  
Terrorism imposes serious negative impact on human and society. Its act of violence towards 
civilians for political purposes attacks the core value of United Nations (UN) regarding the 
“respect for human rights, the rule of law, rules governing armed conflict and the protection 
of civilians, tolerance among peoples and nations, and the peaceful resolution of conflict”. 
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(Harees, 2012) Recognized by the highest level of UN, i.e. the Security Council, the General 
Assembly, and the former Commission on Human Right and the current Human Right 
Council, terrorism has a real and direct impact on human right, where it harms the right to life, 
liberty and physical integrity; it destabilizes governments and civil society; it destroys peace 
and security; and it destroys and slows down economic and cultural development. (Office of 
the United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008) Though some may argue 
that terrorism is causing fewer deaths than hunger and poverty, it should be noted that the 
harm of terrorism is not solely on the number of deaths, but the damage on basic human right 
including security and peace in the long run. Therefore, policies of counter-terrorism that 
promote and implement human rights and rule of law have to be in place.  
While terrorism is not something new as aforementioned, neither does counter-terrorism.  
Back in 1880, militant Irish Fenians carried out terrorist attack in Britain, and Sir William 
Harcourt, the Home Secretary, launched the first counter-terrorism unit. Since then, counter-
terrorism has become the responsibility of the country towards its people. After the 9/11 
attacks, many countries passed legislation to counter-terrorism. Though the goal is the same, 
every country’s counter-terrorism policy does differ from each other. Some countries 
emphasize on military approach, where some on prevention and diplomacy. For an instance, 
Germany has passed the law in restricting terrorists to live and raise money. United Kingdom 
passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005. For United States (US), their Homeland Security Act has created the Department of 
Homeland Security in combating domestic terrorism, and the “USA Patriot Act” has given 
the federal government more power in intelligence gathering. UN Security Council has also 
established the Counter-Terrorism Committee by Security Council resolution 1373 in 2001 
after the 9/11 attacks, with 15 Security Council members, to monitor countries’ 
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implementation of measures for enhancing their legal and institutional ability to counter-
terrorism. (United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2013) 
5.2 Analytical Framework Used 
Counter-terrorism cannot be only done via political and military aspect, where multiple 
aspects should be considered. In this paper, PEST analysis is being used to analysis China’s 
situation in 4 aspects: Political, Economical, Socio-cultural, and Technological.  
Political aspect focuses on issues related to government intervention, including laws, policy, 
regulations, and services that the government provides. In this paper, the discussion on this 
aspect focuses on the third level analysis: Chinese government’s relations with different 
international players and state actors, as well as China’s interest in overseas. Economic aspect 
focuses on economic growth, financial infrastructure and capital flow. In respect to terrorism, 
discussion will be on situation of terrorist financing in China, and measures implemented for 
counter-terrorist-financing. For socio-cultural aspect, it includes the society’s demography, 
culture, mindset of people as well as ideology of people. For terrorism, control of religious 
activities, migration and separatism are analysed. Technological aspect talks about research 
and development, technology incentive and innovation. Relating to terrorism, cyber security, 
media censorship and surveillance technology are concerned.  
6 Why Choosing China?  
Terrorism is a global socio-political issue affecting not only the domestic political 
environment of states but also the international relations as countries have to join forces to 
tackle the problems. Counter-terrorism has also become a major task for China’s current 
president Xi Jinping since he took office more than two years ago. This research project 
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focuses on China’s counter-terrorism measures and the underlying risks because of the 
following reasons: 
6.1 China as an Uprising Power 
China is a major power in the world and influential to the global politics. It has become the 
second largest economy (The World Bank, 2015) and an important player in the Asia Pacific 
region and even the world. How China handles the terrorism, a global issue in which the 
international community is focusing on, directly affect the effectiveness of global counter-
terrorism measures.  
Xi Jinping has demonstrated a more active approach in foreign affairs since he took office. 
He proposed the “One Belt One Road” which covers the western China including Xinjiang, 
the place he called “frontline of terrorism”, and reaching as far as the Middle East and Europe. 
His administration is also taking an increasingly hard line in counter-terrorism measures, and 
has increased the public security bureau’s counter-terrorism budget. In addition, the Chinese 
government is proposing the new counter-terrorism law.  
Terrorism is a global issue and in the study of this topic, it is essential to take into 
consideration the counter-terrorism measures adopted by China, the key player in global 
politics.  
6.2 Proximity 
Terrorist attacks do not only threaten the high-risk areas of terrorism such as the Middle East 
countries, they have also been affecting the political environment of other regions. The UN 
has adopted global counter-terrorism strategies with a common strategic approach to fight 
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terrorism. Having said that, it is important that the member states strengthen their counter-
terrorism efforts in the national level to integrate with the global strategies.  
To facilitate an in-depth analysis in counter-terrorism strategies, we focus on studying the 
risks of one country. China is geographically and politically close to Hong Kong. 
Understanding the risks of the current counter-terrorism measures can serve as a gateway for 
us to discuss terrorism and the significance to global politics. In addition, while many 
discussions on China’s counter-terrorism issues in place are in Chinese, our advantages in 
languages to handle both English and Chinese can effectively and comprehensively 
consolidate the materials for a thorough academic research. 
6.3 Case Studies versus Statistical Data 
In research of the matters related to terrorism, relevant figures usually are classified as 
confidential amid concerns on national security; thus, the counting of terrorist incidents often 
relies on the government officials’ figures and media reports. But in cases when statistical 
data are obtained from authoritarian regimes, it might be problematic. As shown in studies by 
Todd Sandle, Konstantinos Drakos and Andreas Gofas, authoritarian regimes might tend to 
under-report terrorist incidents. (Pokalova, 2013) For an instance, the official figures about 
terrorist incidents and the number of causalities in Xinjiang have many discrepancies and 
raise question on its credibility. (Clarke, 2008) 
In this regard, the case studies approach is used here to overcome quantitative limitations.  
Studying China’s case regarding the counter-terrorism measures and the possible risks 
associated provides an in-depth analysis of terrorism as a global political issue.  
16 
7 Definition of Terrorism in Chinese Government’s Interpretation 
Before investigating into the risks identified in China’s counter-terrorism policies under Xi 
Jinping Administration, one has to understand on one hand what “terrorism” actually means 
to scholars from the fields of international relations and military studies and the relationship 
between the concepts of “terrorism” and “insurgency”; and on the other hand how the 
Chinese government interprets the spirit and content of terrorist activities in its related draft 
laws and official documents.  
7.1 Definition of Terrorism by Scholars 
Currently, there are over 200 definitions on the term “terrorism” published and 90 of them 
are adopted by governments and academic institutions. Hence, no single definition commonly 
agreed by all nations could be retrieved by any means (Matusitz, 2014). According to Peter R. 
Neumann, the Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and 
Political Violence and also a professor at the War Studies Department of King's College in 
London, the attempt to define “terrorism” in a way that entails value judgments on whether or 
not a combatant’s cause is moral, is bound to frame an insecure basis for sufficient definition 
(Neumann & Smith, 2008)  Alex Peter Schmid, the former Officer-in-Charge of the United 
Nations Terrorism Prevention Branch and a scholar specialised in terrorism studies, frames 
“terrorism” comprehensively as “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action… for 
idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct 
targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic 
targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-
based communication processes… are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), 
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turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on 
whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.” (Schmid & Jongman, 
1988), while a consolidated one suggested by James Kiras, a specialist in air and space 
studies involved in several US’ special operations, describes “terrorism” as “the sustained use 
of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups for political purposes, such as 
inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a 
draconian or unsustainable response.” (Baylis & Booth, 1987) 
7.2 Definition of insurgency by Scholars 
As a matter of fact, one could identify a few differences between terrorism and insurgency. 
First of all, terrorism is seen as a method, among others, to achieve the goals of certain 
political movements while insurgency itself is a political effort with specific aims. Secondly, 
terrorism does not target to challenge the existing government directly but works to alter the 
people’s perceptions towards the government’s legitimacy and effectiveness in ruling, 
whereas insurgency acts to fight with the ruling government for control of at least part of the 
territory and sharing of political power. Thirdly, due to the extreme means, terrorism seldom 
obtains support and sympathy from the crowd. On the contrary, blessing from a certain 
portion of population is a pre-requisite for insurgencies.  Fourthly, as spelt out in the above 
definitions, no particular target groups are pinpointed by terrorist groups. In other words, 
terrorism is not having any discrimination of non-combatants against combatants. But for 
insurgency, thanks to the importance of popularity, non-combatants are not targeted. Last but 
not the least, analysing by the legal approach, “terrorism” is a crime-conducting means no 
matter under civil or military legal codes but insurgency is to a certain extent adherent to 
norms of international community as to the law of war. 
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7.3 Chinese Government’s Interpretation of Terrorism 
Having listed out the major differences between terrorism and insurgency as identified by the 
academics and theorists, Chinese government’s interpretation of terrorism as perceived from 
its official documents and laws could be put under examination to show its distinction from 
the main-stream saying, if any. In accordance with the draft anti-terrorism law tabled at a 
meeting of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress in March 2015, 
terrorism is defined as "any speech or activity that, by means of violence, sabotage or threat, 
generates social panic, undermines public security, and menaces government organs and 
international organisations." (Xinhua, Lawmakers weigh China's draft anti-terrorism law, 
2015) And the draft submitted in October 2014 even included thoughts further to speeches 
and activities, though it was removed in the revised draft for the sake of applicability. It could 
be understood that China has been adopting a broader definition of terrorism, regardless of 
the objectives or goals of the speeches and activities but emphasis has been put onto the point 
of national and social security. As early as in 2003, the Ministry of Public Security of China 
had issued a list of “terrorist organisations” made up of activist group names such as the East 
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) which has been seeking independence of Xinjiang. 
While one would question how the counter-terrorism law implementation could proceed 
without an independent judiciary set up, which could provide clearer and fairer judgments on 
the nature of alleged terrorist incidents, in-depth analysis on current anti-terrorism measures 
in China and their implied risks would be presented in the upcoming sections by political, 
economic, social and technological approaches. 
8 Situation in China  
8.1 Historical Background: Evolution of China’s Stance on Terrorist Groups  
19 
As China emerges as a rising power, its stance on different terrorist groups has evolved over 
the past several decades, changing from open support, to disengagement and then to active 
opposition.  
Under the Maoist era, its foreign policy was largely influenced by the Communist ideology. 
China viewed itself as a victim of imperialism. It identified itself with world’s oppressed 
peoples and states and their fight for national independence. (Mark, 2013) Therefore it 
supported different liberation movements in the developing world, including the liberation of 
Palestine. (Cooley, 1972) It even openly supported terrorist groups such as the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
(Potter, 2013).  
After taking power in late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping focused on internal economic reform and 
the opening-up of China. Hence China’s foreign policy was adjusted, putting the 
relationships with the radical organisations and marginalized states as lower priority, and 
hence disengaged with them. (Potter, 2013)  
Then China went further to become actively opposed to international terrorism. In 1990s, 
there was increasing concern on separatist movements in Xinjiang with the collapse of Soviet 
Union stimulating ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule. (Clarke, 2008)  As China 
started to be an uprising power, the international community also expected China become 
more engaged on global issues. The 9/11 attacks also gave China an opportunity to speed up 
its shift on counter-terrorism policy. (Clarke, 2008) China’s ostensible support on US strikes 
in Afghanistan was also the first time since the Cold War that China had condoned US 
military strikes in another country. (Dynon, China's "War on Terror" in Xinjiang, 2013)  
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As some scholars point out, with the collapse of Soviet Union, the US was left as the sole 
superpower in world politics. (Paul J. Bolt, 2008) The direction of bilateral relations with 
other countries such as China became uncertain as the strategic consensus on issues related to 
Soviet Union did not exist anymore. In the decade before 9/11 attacks, Sino-US relations had 
been strained by the Taiwan issue, trade disputes, human rights issues and arms sales. So 
while the 9/11 attacks prompted China to be more actively involved in global counter-
terrorism, it also gave China an opportunity to find another strategic consensus with the US.  
Therefore, with its national security concern, pressures from international community as well 
as the calculations on Sino-US relations, China has become more active on international 
security cooperation. 
8.2 General Situation in China 
8.2.1 Global Terrorism Index 
As mentioned, to understand the impact of terrorism on different countries through empirical 
studies is never an easy task. The definition of “terrorism” can be varied among different law 
enforcement authorities. And the statistical data from authoritarian regimes might not be 
reliable and comprehensive.  
Therefore it would be preferable to use the data from independent research or academic 
organisations. The independent and non-partisan think tank Institute for Economics and 
Peace produces the Global Terrorism Index every year which is based on data from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD is considered as the most comprehensive 
dataset on terrorist activity around the world from 1970 through 2014. (Overview of the GTD) 
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The information recorded in the database is based on reports from variety of open media 
source, and the information source is determined as credible by the research team.  
According to the Global Terrorism Index 2014, China ranks 25. It is also one of the 24 
countries that lost over 50 lives to terrorist attacks in 2013. (Peace, 2014) And based on the 
data from GTD, it shows that the number of terrorist incidents is in increasing trend from 
2000 to 2014.  
Figure 1 No of terrorist incidents in China (1989 – 2014) 
Data source: Global Terrorism Database 
Definition of terrorism: “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor 
to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” 
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incidents throughout the country, claiming over 200 people’s lives. (Global Terrorism 
Database, 2015) The Chinese government officials also blamed the Xinjiang separatists for 
the brutal killing at Kunming railway station in March 2014. Analysts argue that this increase 
in attacks reflects the failure of China’s existing counter-terrorism measures and there should 
be an overhaul on it. (Dynon, Kunming: A New Phase of Terrorism in China, 2014)  
Actually counter-terrorism, particularly in Xinjiang, has become one of the focuses for Xi 
Jinping and his government. China’s media reported that within two months (March – April 
2014), Xi mentioned counter-terrorism publicly for 15 times, showing an unprecedented 
counter-terrorism campaign already launched. (News, 2014)  
Following his high-profile visit to Xinjiang and the deadly attack in Urumqi railway station 
on the same day as he completed the visit in late April 2014, Xi Jinping announced to deploy 
a “strike-first approach against terrorism” campaign in the region. (Branigan, China's Xi 
warns of 'strike-first' strategy after militants bomb capital of Xinjiang, 2014) It is reported 
that the number of arrests in Xinjiang in that year increased nearly a double. (Areddy, 2015) 
Within a year, the Xinjiang local officials told Chinese media that 181 groups had been 
broken up, all but less than 4% of them before they had chances to carry out any attacks. 
The Xinjiang’s public security budget for 2014 was also increased by 24%, to RMB 6.1 
billion. Among which, RMB 2 million was to be used counter-terrorism. (JIA,CUI and BO, 
GAO, 2014)  
In early 2014, Chinese authorities arrested Ilham Tohti, the outspoken Uyghur scholar who 
criticized  government policies in Xinjiang. He was found guilty of separatism and sentenced 
for life in September 2014.  
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8.2.3 Establishment of China’s National Security Commission 
One year after Xi Jinping took office as the President, he announced to set up National 
Security Commission, and made himself as the chairman. Officially established in January 
2014, it is the Communist Party of China (CPC) agency responsible for “decision-making, 
deliberation and coordination on national security work”. (Xinhua, Xi Jinping to lead national 
security commission, 2014) 
The official explanation is “to strengthen the unified leadership of state security work which 
is an urgent need”. (Xinhua, Xi Jinping to lead national security commission, 2014) As 
scholar David M. Lampton points out, this actually aims at alleviating the coordination 
problem of security and foreign policy that China suffering for long. (Lampton, 2015)  
On one hand, the number of countries that have built diplomatic relations with China has 
about tripled since 1971, the number of domestic security, diplomatic and international 
security policy-related bureaucracies has expanded, globalization and China’s expanding 
power in maritime and in the air are some of the factors that makes coordination more and 
more difficult.  On the other hand, the close link between external and internal security in 
Chinese leaders’ thinking also poses challenge to the coordination. From China’s perspective, 
maintaining internal stability is indispensable for national security. But observers have noted 
that sometimes there are communications gaps among China’s bureaucratic apparatuses, or 
even they compete with each other. (Lampton, 2015) 
However, being established for a year or more, there is still little information on the 
organisation and operation of the Commission to the outsiders. But whether the Commission 
can improve the long-standing coordination is yet to be known. 
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8.2.4 National Security Law & Counter-Terrorism Law 
The recently-passed National Security Law in China lays out the guiding principles and 
framework related to national security. It emphasizes the necessity to “defend the 
fundamental interests of the people” and take “all measures necessary” to protect the country. 
It also states clearly in the first article that the law aims to “protect the political power of the 
people’s democratic dictatorship and the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics”, 
and in the fourth article it insists the CPC to take the lead in national security work.  
Echoing with the establishment of the National Security Commission, the law also assigns 
the “central national security leading authority” to be in charge of the decision-making and 
coordination related to national security work, and to advice on the implementation of the 
policy related to national security strategy. (Xinhua, China's National Security Law Full Text 
(中華人民共和國國家安全法全文), 2015) 
The National Security Law is actually one of five laws being drafted or recently passed that 
help to strengthen national security measures. The previous National Security Law was 
adopted in 1993 and was deemed as out-dated in view of the new development in national 
security. Hence the Counter-espionage Law was passed last year to replace it. Three other 
laws currently in draft are related to counter-terrorism, cyber-security and foreign NGOs. 
(ChinaNews, 2015) 
Similar to the National Security Law, the proposed draft of Counter-Terrorism Law only lays 
down the guiding principles. Local governments at different levels, eg provincial level, still 
have to set up its own counter-terrorism agency and implement the strategy. 
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8.2.5 People’s War Against Terrorism Throughout the Country 
Apart from reinforcing the strike-hard campaign in Xinjiang, China’s government also steps 
up different measures throughout the country for counter-terrorism. As the Xinjiang’s CPC 
Secretary Zhang Chunxian phrased, it is a “people’s war against terrorism”. (Xinhua, 
Xinjiang's Party chief wages 'people's war' against terrorism, 2014)  
Different propaganda activities have been launched. For an instance, in mid-July 2014, the 
national counter-terrorism office issued a citizens’ anti-terrorism manual in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Henan and Guangdong provinces, as well as Xinjiang, to educate the public how to prevent 
and react in case of terrorist attacks. (Yan, Zhang and Mengwei, Chen, 2014) The Beijing 
city government even claimed that around 850,000 people, mostly pensioners in 60s and 70s 
and retired party members, were mobilized as counter-terrorism volunteers to form patrol 
teams on the streets. (Chen A. , 2014) 
Extra efforts are also deployed on counter-terrorism intelligence collection from the members 
of the public. Informants can receive reward up to half a million (RMB) in Jiangsu and 
Liaoning provinces, the Inner Mongolia autonomous region and major cities such as Chengdu, 
Sichuan province, and Wuhan, Hubei province, RMB 300,000 in Tibet, while authorities in 
cities like Shenzhen and Zhongshan, Guangdong province, set no limit for rewards, according 
to local governments’ websites and officials. (Chen A. , 2014) (Yan, Zhang and Mengwei, 
Chen, 2014) (Xinhua, Tibet offers reward to anti-terror tip-off, 2015)  
9 Measures in Place & Risks 
As mentioned previously, PEST analysis is being used to analysis China’s situation in 4 
aspects: Political, Economical, Socio-cultural, and Technological. 
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9.1 Political 
Counter-terrorism to China is more than a domestic issue. It has a role in China’s external 
relations with the international community. Putting counter-terrorism at the right position of 
the agenda for international collaborations would for sure benefit China while she is still on 
the way to open up itself to other parts of the world. In this section, China’s existing counter-
terrorism measures on international level will be assessed. The role of counter-terrorism 
efforts in linking up China with the rest of the world through multilateral organisations, for 
example, the UN and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and with other major 
powers such as the US will also be revealed.  
9.1.1 Under the Roof of UN: China’s Stance towards International “Counter-terrorism”  
As stipulated in the Article 23, Chapter V of the UN Charter, the Security Council, being a 
division primarily responsible to maintain international peace and security, is made up by 
fifteen members of the UN, among which China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and 
the US are the permanent members.  As a matter of fact, counter-terrorism has been an 
indispensable topic on the agenda of the Security Council.  For this reason, a committee 
called Counter-Terrorism Committee was set up in 2001 with same composition of the 
Security Council after the 9/11 attacks in the US. The mandate of this Committee is to:  
(i) criminalize the financing of terrorism; (ii) freeze without delay any funds related to 
persons involved in acts of terrorism; (iii) deny all forms of financial support for terrorist 
groups; (iv) suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for terrorists; (v) 
share information with other governments on any groups practicing or planning terrorist acts; 
(vi) cooperate with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition and 
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prosecution of those involved in such acts; and (vii) criminalize active and passive assistance 
for terrorism in domestic law and bring violators to justice.” (The United Nations, 2001)  
In 2014, the Security Council moved the Resolution 2195, reiterating the member states’ 
obligation to work in line with the relevant international laws to avoid terrorist movements 
and requesting concerned UN entities to help member states implement appropriate 
international instruments in relation to counter-terrorism so that their capacity in swiftly 
responding to terrorist activities could be enhanced.  
With the objective of building up a responsible image on the international arena, China has 
been taking diplomatic steps under the UN framework. A statement delivered by Ambassador 
Wang Min, the Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN, at a briefing session by 
the chairmen of Security Council subsidiaries in May 2014 could shed some light in this 
aspect. In his address, China was said to compliment the role and work of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee given its important responsibility and to support the Committee’s 
mandate and efforts to enhance the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 
regarding counter-terrorism, particularly by means of conducting implementation assessment 
and organizing meetings and state visits. Most importantly, Ambassador Wang pointed out 
that China would continue to take part proactively in international joint efforts in counter-
terrorism within the framework of Security Council. Alongside the robust economic 
developments contributed by more substantial linkages with other parts of the world in recent 
years, China is expected to take up more responsibility and to speak out more in international 
affairs than in the past, including the counter-terrorism efforts. Therefore, one could observe 
that China is faced with the tension between addressing the counter-terrorism issue by 
international cooperation and desiring to constrain it as a domestic agenda item.  
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In the meantime, the demand from certain countries such as Japan and India to restructure the 
UN Security Council by adding more permanent membership poses threats and challenges to 
China’s and other existing members’ prestigious positions, namely their veto rights in the 
Security Council. Furthermore, developing countries make up almost 80 per cent of the total 
number of countries in the world, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2015). 
Inadequate representation of developing countries and countries in continents including 
Africa and South America are also factors for advocating the UN Security Council reform.  
Along the way, China’s stance was that, she “supports the reform and stands for enhancing 
the representativeness and raising the voice of developing countries and maintains that 
agreement and consensus be reached on various issues through extensive and democratic 
consultation.” (Hong L. , 2015)  Not suggesting any time table for the reform, China as the 
only permanent member of the UN Security Council representing the developing country 
group against the current backdrop, is to shoulder more responsibilities in global issues 
threatening the security and stability of the emerging economies. Also, while China is not 
supporting the addition of developed nations to the Security Council as permanent members, 
it has to address the interest of Western countries which is being gradually undermined by 
terrorist activities. The above efforts in tandem would lead to deeper involvement of China in 
UN’s counter-terrorism initiatives. 
9.1.2 From Diplomacy to Practices – China’s Participation in Regional Counter-terrorism 
Efforts 
In a regional context, China’s role in multilateral counter-terrorism collaborations is more 
visible comparing to that in the UN. The SCO, a regional pact formed by China and her 
bordering neighbours in Central Asia, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan 
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and Uzbekistan in 15 June 2001 would be an imperative example for studying. The major 
reason is that the current contracting nations of SCO are all bordering with or near the north-
western part of China, or the Xinjiang area. This situation leads China to take concrete 
actions instead of just disseminating counter-terrorism messages by diplomatic means, 
speeches or moral suasions.  
In fact, the SCO was established with one of the goals being maintaining and ensuring peace, 
security and stability in the region. And a permanent body called the Executive Committee of 
the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS) was set up as a platform for the member 
states to join hands to fight against the “three evil forces”: terrorism, separatism and 
extremism.  
These three target forces are actually at the same time among the names quoted by China as 
threatening her national security while the appointment of Zhang Xinfeng, China’s Deputy 
Minister of Public Security, as the Director of RCTS since January 2013 further increased 
China’s international exposure in terms of counter-terrorism. As early as in 2003, the member 
states organised joint military drills under the name of “Peace Mission”. With presence of 
Heads of Member States in the military exercises, “Peace Mission” has been serving as a 
launch pad for member states’ weapons and military deployment plans. In August 2014, 
China hosted the largest-ever military exercise in Inner Mongolia, on her own land. (Tiezzi, 
2014) More than the 2013 edition, 7,000 soldiers from five member states joined with the 
Central Asian member countries except Uzbekistan each sent a few hundreds of elite troops. 
The scenario for “Peace Mission 2014” was that, a separatist movement involving terrorist 
attacks happened in a country with the support of an international terrorist organisation. 
Having consolidated the above moves by China in this regional organisation, one could 
perceive that China is practising firm and military approaches to tackle potential terrorist 
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attacks around her own territory and the neighbouring countries sharing similar cultures, 
languages and religions with Xinjiang and other areas inhabited by ethnic minorities become 
priority allies in her international counter-terrorism strategy.  
In July 2015, the SCO announced to accept India and Pakistan as its full members and the 
membership is expected to be finalised in 2016. While the chemistry of the expansion of 
membership stays uncertain, it could be assured that the element of counter-terrorism would 
remain a focus. Similar to China’s situation of being threatened by extreme Islamic groups, 
India has been suffering radical actions by Islamic army for decades. Thus, cross-border 
terrorism is a common challenge for both China and India. When Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2015, the two leaders 
declared that the countries’ mutual resolve against terror and called on all nations and entities 
to collaborate sincerely to break down terrorist networks and the related financing, and to 
stop cross-border transfer of terrorists. In bilateral manner, China and India had conducted 
joint military exercise with focus on counter-terrorism since 2007. Another round of similar 
exercise lasting for 10 days is anticipated in November 2015 around the western borders of 
India. From an objective point of view, the expansion of membership base would allow more 
resources, no matter in aspects of human capitals, technology and funding, to be devoted to 
counter-terrorism initiatives of the organisation. 
9.1.3 Facing Terrorism: China and the US Cooperate or Compete? 
Among all China’s bilateral relations with other nations, Sino-US relations should be the 
most essential one in terms of economic, military and political powers of the counterpart. 
Analysing Sino-US relations is no easy task as it has multiple fronts. For the sake of 
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extracting essence of counter-terrorism efforts by the two countries, the bilateral relationship 
would be divided simply into the cooperative and competitive sides.  
After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he introduced a concept of “New-type of Major-
country Relations” to depict the new phase of Sino-US relationship. Xi outlined 6 priorities 
for building this new relationship when he met with the US President Barack Obama in 
Beijing. In the context of the cooperation, the two states should deepen cooperation in all 
aspects including trade, military, counterterrorism, law enforcement, energy, health and 
infrastructure. And according to Xi, the cooperation should be all-around, involving 
governments, parliaments, media, think tanks and young people. (Xinhua, Xi talks with 
Obama, pledges commitment to new-type of major-country relations, 2014)  And specifically, 
the two states will continue to enhance cooperation in areas of  law enforcement, such as 
jointly hunting down fugitives, recovering their ill-gotten assets, fighting drug trafficking and 
cyber-crimes. Synchronised with this framework, China and the US hold bilateral dialogue 
on counter-terrorism on regular basis. The 2014 session reaffirmed the two sides’ 
commitment to address the threats posed by terrorism to both nations and the international 
community and agreed that the success of U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
could set the tone for deeper bilateral relations, in which counter-terrorism is an important 
part. (The U.S. Department of States , 2014)  
However, even though the two states in principle agree on collaboration to manipulate 
terrorism, their ways of carrying out the objectives differ from each other. After the US 
bombed Syria without the consent of the UN, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke at a 
UN Security Council meeting, stressing that collective anti-terrorism measures have to be 
taken within the framework of the UN and the Security Council and other means such as 
cyber code of conduct, border controls and financial regulations have to be considered. One 
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could decode the message as an objection to the US’ counter-terrorism operations by war 
without permission of the UN. (Meng, 2014) 
On the competitive front, as viewed by many others, China is emerging not only as a great 
economy, but also being more and more influential in global military and political 
discussions. The success of the US for being a military hegemony in the world could be 
attributable to its global deployment of her troops. Currently, the US has a strong naval force 
made up of over 270 ships and more than 3,700 aircrafts. The critical factor is that, the naval 
force is well dispersed over the 370-plus bases around the globe such as Guam, Yokosuka 
(Japan), Naples (Italy), Manama (Bahrain) and Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), in addition to those 
areas under the spotlight for counter-terrorism including Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia 
and Nigeria.  
In recent years, China has been advancing its military forces particularly the naval force. For 
example, she had renovated an old aircraft-carrier bought from Ukraine over a decade ago 
into the Liaoning carrier and was seen by the public in 2012 while media now says the 
second one is in the pipeline. The direction of elevating the standard and capability of the 
navy is in line with the policy that China is to defend the waters in South China Sea disputed 
with neighbouring countries like the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. Acknowledging the 
importance of sea power to China, overseas deployment of Chinese troops in the name of 
counter-terrorism to gain military influence could be feasible if things are put in a realist 
mindset. 
Apart from the military competition with the US, China has a need to protect her overseas 
interests and personnel which increase significantly together with its economic growth in 
recent years. It is about domestic politics. After outflowing money for overseas investment, 
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China now has considerable billion-worth energy interests, infrastructure projects and mining 
resources in the Middle East and the African continent. And with Africa alone, China traded 
goods worth nearly 160 billion US dollars in 2013, equivalent to more than 15% of the 
overall trade of Africa. Also in the past decade, more than 1 million Chinese people have 
moved to Africa to make a living. (One among many, 2015) These are the unstable areas of 
the world partly due to terrorist attacks. Further to invested projects in the past, China is now 
advocating the economic initiative “One Belt, One Road” for boosting the trade between 
China and Europe by the “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road”, passing through some 60 countries including those in West Asia, Persian Gulf and 
Africa. Expecting projects each valued at tens of billions, an effective deployment of military 
forces in those areas would lead to swift evacuation arrangement for the overseas Chinese in 
case of warfare and minimise the loss in terms of economic assets. This is a natural request 
from the Chinese people so as to be assured of certain level of protection in overseas and the 
domestic request is to be converted into the government’s foreign policy. In the draft counter-
terrorism law, there was an article laying legal framework for sending troops for overseas 
counter-terrorism missions. That particular article would authorise military and security 
personnel to carry out counter-terrorism operations upon the consent of the relevant countries. 
Actually, overseas security operations are nothing unprecedented to China. (Martina, Draft 
Chinese law paves way for counter-terror operations abroad, 2015) In 2011, in collaboration 
with Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, China’s gunboats conducted anti-drug-running operation 
in Mekong River and Chinese navy had a few rounds of patrol around the Horn of Africa for 
tackling the pirates’ issue. 
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9.1.4 Risks Identified from the Existing Measures 
Having studied in detail China’s existing political measures in place in relation to counter-
terrorism on international, regional, bilateral and domestic levels, one could identify the risks 
emerged together with the opportunities. By looking into China’s diplomatic approaches for 
counter-terrorism with emphasis on the framework of UN, there could be conspiracy on 
China being one of the interest parties possessing veto rights at the UN Security Council in 
the existing international system, which is governed by a set of rules representing the 
distribution of power decades ago. The same question could be raised on China’s relatively 
conservative stance towards the reform of the UN and the UN Security Council. Risk on this 
side would be China’s diminishing connection with the majority of developing countries, 
when it is viewed that China and those states are no longer sharing common interests. This 
point reveals especially when China is planning to be involved in overseas counter-terrorism 
operations in the states’ territories. In the eyes of developed western countries, although 
China has been reiterating the importance of the UN role, nearly no visible and substantial 
steps have been taken at least when comparing with China’s participation in SCO. China’s 
commitment in fighting against terrorists through the UN structure could then be challenged. 
As to China’s counter-terrorism efforts in the SCO, risks of being accused of forming 
military alliances with Russia and other Central Asian states appear in view of the heavy 
military element in the bloc’s counter-terrorism initiatives. It is also observed whether or not 
the SCO would become a second North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led by the US 
or the Warsaw Pact coordinated by the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the use of military 
forces would generate an impression that China is not on the track of peaceful rise but 
expanding her own military capabilities. To a certain extent, if China were to manipulate 
terrorist groups by military forces, it could be argued that China is walking back on what they 
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have been advocating in the UN, that is, to tackle terrorists by control of cyber networks, 
borders and financial systems. At the same time, carrying out counter-terrorism operations in 
overseas could challenge the respect to other countries’ sovereignty, one of the core values 
that China has been pursuing. With its foreign policy still largely dominated by the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, how could China be on one hand 
blaming the US for undermining other states’ sovereignty with imperialism but on the other 
hand sending troops overseas to carry out counter-terrorism operations? If it is so, will China 
agree if foreign troops are to do the same in Chinese territory? 
9.2 Economical 
9.2.1 Definition of Terrorist Financing 
According to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
by the UN, a person commits the crime of terrorist financing “if that person by any means, 
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention 
that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in 
order to carry out any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, 
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, 
or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act.” (United Nations General Assembly, 1999) On top of “provide” and “collect” mentioned 
by UN, “solicit” is also included as per the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IMF, 2015). 
The Chartered Secretaries also issued the “Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Financing”, listing that “carrying out transactions involving funds that are owned by terrorists” 
is also an act of terrorist financing. (The Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries, 2014) 
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In simple words, terrorist financing is the way of owning and providing funds for terrorist 
activities.  
Sources of terrorist funds vary. Funds of terrorist financial can be from legitimate sources, 
like profit from normal businesses, personal wealth from families, or donation from charity 
organization. Funds can also be from criminal activities, including fraud, smuggling, drug 
trafficking, or even kidnapping. In short, terrorist financing is regardless of how the funds are 
being raised.  
People committing terrorist financing, named as terrorist, use all kinds of mean in 
transferring funds, usually in low value but high volume, according to IMF. (IMF, 2015) 
They use the formal banking system, information value-transfer systems like the shadow 
banking market, hedge funds around the world in listed or non-listed markets, gambling, 
physical transport of cash or gold, or other valuable goods via smuggling.  
9.2.2 Terrorist Financing and Money Laundry 
There are differences between terrorist financing and money laundry. While money laundry 
is referring to the process in making cash or assets obtained from criminal activities to look 
legitimate for re-integration into the financial system, terrorist financing does not focus on 
the process but the end that the funds used is for terrorist activities. While people commit in 
money laundry focus on concealing the sources of the funds and the process of integrating 
them into the financial system, people commit in terrorist financing focus on concealing the 
activities and the nature of activities they fund. While the funds of money laundry are raised 
from criminal activities including drug trafficking and smuggling, as mentioned funds of 
terrorist financing can be from both criminal and legitimate sources.  
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Though there are differences, terrorist financing and money laundry are always interlacing 
with each other. Both of them are using the financial industry in an illegitimate manner 
during the inflow and outflow of funds. Both of them are hiding some information from 
authorities, using similar if not identical techniques, to distract others’ attention and to protect 
the identity of people behind the funds, as well as the ultimate beneficiaries owners of the 
funds. With the similarities of techniques used in terrorist financing and money laundry, they 
are usually being linked together.  
9.2.3 Combating Terrorist Financing on International Level 
One of the most effective ways in combating terrorism is via financial path. As per the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the UN has 
noted, “the number and seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing 
that terrorists may obtain”. (United Nations General Assembly, 1999) 
As mentioned, terrorist financing and money laundry are always being linked together, and 
therefore so as the combating methods. The counter-terrorist financing (CTF) and anti-money 
laundry (AML) both aim at fighting the criminals or terrorists by attacking their financial 
activities, and use their financial traits to locate the criminal and terrorist network. They 
prevent, detect and punish first the illegal funds entering the financial system, and second the 
funding of terrorist organization and activities. In most legislation, CTF and AML are often 
listed in the same legislation, or tackle by the same body. The most significant organization 
in CFT and AML is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-government body aims 
at developing and promoting policies, both national and international, to combat terrorist 
financing and money laundry. (IMF, 2015) The Warsaw Convention, a European Union (EU) 
conventions signed on 16 May 2005, is the convention on “Laundry, Search, Seizure and 
38 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism”. (Council of 
Europe, 2005) The International Association for Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) issued a 
guidance paper in October 2004, focusing on the anti-money laundry and combating the 
financing of terrorism. In the below, CTF and AML, so as terrorist financing and money 
laundry, will be joint together for analysing situation in China.  
9.2.4 CTF Related Situation in China 
9.2.4.1 Economic Situation in China 
China currently is with a socialist market economy, changed from a communist planned 
economy, since the launch of open-up policy in 1978. In this economy, the state-owned 
enterprises are driving the major force of economic development, complimented by some 
domestic or international private enterprises. This drive from these state-owned enterprises 
and the socialist economic structure have hindered China to become an major financial centre 
in the world, as there are still control over the capital flow and the exchange and settlement of 
Renminbi (RMB).  
Even not being the major financial centre in the world, China’s economy has surged in an 
astonishing manner in the past 30 decades. In 1978, annual GDP of China was of USD217b, 
where in 2014 it has increased to USD10,361b, jumped by 47 times. The annual growth of 
GDP is also significant with over 7% every year in the past decade. (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2014) With the tremendous economic development in the recent decade, 
China has become a hub for international trading transactions, especially by riding on the 
Special Administration Regions of Hong Kong and Macau, the Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) of over 18 cities including ShenZhen, Xiamen and Hainan, and the Special Trade Zone 
like Shanghai since Sep13. In 2012, China has overtaken US as the largest good trading 
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nation. Till today, China has already been the second largest economy after US, and is very 
likely to overtake US by 2030. (The World Bank, 2015)  
9.2.4.2 Terrorist Financing and Money Laundry in China 
According to the report issued by Global Financial Integrity (GFI) in 2014, the estimated 
illicit financial flows from China between 2002 and 2011 summed up to USD1.08t, where 
these outflow is believed to be used in fuelling crime, corruption and terrorist activities both 
inside and outside China. (Gascoigne, 2014) As there is no official and verified amount of 
fund used in terrorist financing due to its undisclosed nature, this flow of illicit financial 
flows can be an appropriate proxy in understanding the great amount of terrorist financing.  
Figure 2 Illicit financial flows from China between 2002 and 2011 
 
 
Source: The Global Financial Integrity (2014), http://www.gfintegrity.org/chinas-illicit-outflows-2002-2011-
us1-08-trillion/ 
Noted from the above trend, it is believed that the amount of money laundered in China and 
used for terrorist financing is significant. One of the reasons for this significance is the rapid 
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growing trade volume – this provides many good opportunities for criminals in cleaning the 
proceed from crime, and to hide the ultimate use of the fund as the government is facing a 
great challenge to balance the monitoring of fund and the pace of economic development.  
According to FATF, four methods of transmitting fund to terrorist financing are being used 
frequently in China. Firstly, funding to terrorist activities is directly by cash via cash 
smuggling. This includes carrying cash by hiding them in vehicles or even in human body, 
and hand over these cash to terrorists who take action. Secondly, the legitimate financial 
system is used by transmitting funds via account payments, credit transactions, loans 
repayment or offshore businesses, to designated people or organization related to terrorist 
organizations. Thirdly, trading activities, such as import/export contracts and open accounts, 
involving goods and services of undeterminable prices are employed. Finally, terrorists may 
also use the underground banking system, i.e. shadow banking market (SBM), to avoid any 
regulation. Similar in these 4 methods, funds are usually being repeatedly transferred in and 
out from different individuals and organization to hide their final destination.  
The use of the fourth method, i.e. using the SBM, is particularly serious in China, in view of 
the huge size of SBM in the country. In 2013, SBM in China was around USD7.5t, which 
was 30% of the country’s total banking asset, 40% of the total financial assets and 70% of the 
GDP (Schuman, 2013). Though now ranked 12th globally in term of size (Rabinovitch, 2013), 
China’s SBM has grown rapidly in the past decade: its volume has increased by 67% between 
2010 and 2012 (Cary, 2013); where its growth rate was 42% in 2012 and estimated to be 46% 
in 2013 - the fastest in the world (FSB, 2013). This large and unregulated market is ideal for 
the terrorist to transfer funds from unidentified sources to unidentified individuals or 
organization, without being tracked or monitored by any regulations, especially after the 
stringent AML efforts in place in the recent years.  
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9.2.5 Stance of Chinese Government in CTF and AML 
The stance of the Chinese government towards terrorist financing and money laundering is 
very solid and clear – both should be cracked down no matter how they are being conducted, 
and who are conducting them. After the 9/11 attacks, President Hu Jintao at that time 
mentioned in a public occasion, “Terrorist financing is the key fund sources and bases for 
terrorists and terrorism organization to exist, develop and conduct terrorist activities. To 
succeed in anti-terrorism, we must obtain and eliminate terrorist financing activities.” (China 
News, 2002) 
While developing economy, Chinese government has placed equal emphasis on CTF and 
AML, and has announced four principles in the formation of CTF and AML policies:- 
• Prevent the use by criminals and terrorists of the financial system, in the method of 
improving the integrity and risk-management of financial institutions and deepening 
Chinese financial system’s integration with the global economy 
• Develop a monitoring system to track the movement of funds and to report any 
large amount and suspicious transactions, where this system should penetrate across 
all government department, and grant law enforcement and judicial authority to the 
system for combating criminal activities 
• Enforce international cooperation for building a more effective international 
network to combat especially cross-border CTF and AML 
• Participate actually in international and regional CTF and AML initiative  
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9.2.6 Institutional Framework for CTF and AML in China 
In the institutional framework of China, different types of bodies have taken up different 
responsibilities and performed different functions. These bodies include the 1) policy co-
ordination bodies; 2) law enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial authorities; 3) supervisory 
authorities; and 4) international co-operation bodies.  
9.2.6.1 Policy co-ordination bodies:  
In the category of policy co-ordination bodies, AML Joint-ministerial conference and 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) are the most important two. The AML Joint-ministerial 
conference is a national interagency cooperation led by the governor. This conference leads 
and inspires all China’s CTF and AML initiatives, where all decision related to CTF and 
AML have to go through this conference for discussion. The PBC, the central bank of China, 
also plays a vital role and has a ranking equal to a minister. It bears the responsibility of 
coordinating and organizing all initiatives decided in the AML Joint-ministerial conference, 
and acts as the spokesperson in the international arena regarding the cooperation and 
information exchange of CTF and AML. 
9.2.6.2 Law enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial authorities:  
Having the Chinese legal system as skeleton, for CTF and AML, Ministry of Public Security 
(MPS), Ministry of State Security (MSS), Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC) and General Administration of Customs (GCA) are involved. MPS and 
MSS participate in the investigation and information collection of terrorist financing and 
money laundering, where SPP, SPC and GCA is the legal bodies that supervise and direct the 
arrest, prosecution as well as law interpretation for trails.  
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9.2.6.3 Supervisory authorities:  
Different supervisory authorities have been established in China for different sectors, 
including the public sector, financial sector and the non-bank financial sector. They ensure 
the related parties act in compliance to the CTF and AML regulations, and also assist the 
AML Joint-ministerial conference and PBC on developing CTF and AML measures for each 
sector.  
9.2.7 International Cooperation  
In recent years, China has become more and more integrated into the international regulatory 
framework, and has joined couples of taskforce in order to better combat terrorist financing 
with the international partners. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Justice 
are the two official bodies that represent China for CTF and AML international cooperation. 
They facilitate China’s participation in international or regional CTF and AML organization, 
and obtain mutual understanding in these areas for treaties and conventions.  
9.2.8 Designated Decision of Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
As mentioned previously, CTF and AML are in most cases being discussed together in 
Chinese government’s interpretation and discussion. On 29 October 2011, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress has issued the first designated decision 
pinpointing counter-terrorism work, adopted at the 23rd meeting of the Standing Committee 
of the 11th National People’s Congress. This decision has strengthened China’s counter-
terrorism work to “protect the national security and the life and property safety of the people, 
and maintain the social order.” (The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of 
China, 2011)  
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This decision is the first direction given by the Standing Committee in establishing the 
counter-terrorism structure in freezing the terrorist’s assets. In the decision, it has clearly 
listed the responsibilities for legal bodies and financial institutions, in freezing assets related 
to terrorism, even in circumstances without instruction from the judicial or law enforcement 
bodies. However, in the international arena this had been criticized that no actual action had 
been instructed in this decision issued.  
9.2.9 Designated Administrative Measures for CTF 
With the decision made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 
2011, in 2014 there is a breakthrough for CTF, where the first designated administrative 
measure for CTF has been issued by the PBC, MSP and MSS. The Administrative Measures 
for the Freezing of Assets Relating to Terrorist Activities is issued and effective on 
10Jan2014, in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, and then Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
Issues concerning Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Work, and other relevant laws. (The 
People's Bank of China, 2014) 
This has been viewed as one of the milestones for China in CTF, as this administrative 
measure, riding on the decision made, has tackled the area that China is always being 
criticized – the actual actions being taken in freezing of assets relating to terrorist activities. 
As mentioned in the First Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering And 
Combating The Financing of Terrorism for the People’s Republic of China issued by FATF, 
FATF criticized China for not establishing “a special dissemination procedure dealing with 
the freezing of assets of UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) (UNSCR 1267) and 
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) (UNSCR 1373) designated terrorists and 
45 
related measures”. (Financial Action Task Froce, 2007) This leads to indifference, in both 
legal and policy, between the freezing of terrorist or other criminal funds. In the 
recommendation of the report, FATF asked China to pay special attention to “giving clear 
instructions and guidance to all relevant sectors… on their obligations in this respect, 
defining in particular what assets the freezing orders target and their relation to the 
individuals and entities involved”. (Financial Action Task Froce, 2007)  
The Administrative Measures for the Freezing of Assets Relating to Terrorist Activities has 
filled this gap. The measures have listed the responsibilities of financial institution and non-
bank financial institution in freezing the assets involved in terrorist financing, clear criteria in 
unfreezing suspicious assets, management of the frozen asset, legal protection of property 
rights of related individuals and organization, as well as the punishment and penalty in 
violating the regulations. It lists clearly that “Financial institutions and specific non-financial 
institutions shall take measures to freeze relevant assets pursuant to law and in strict 
accordance with the list of terrorist organizations and terrorists and the decisions on asset 
freeze issued by the MPS”, and “Financial institutions and specific non-financial institutions 
shall immediately take freezing measures once any assets owned or controlled by terrorist 
organizations and terrorists are discovered.” (The People's Bank of China, 2014) With this 
measure, China has met the obligations deriving from the UN regulations, connected China’s 
legal system with the international ones, and has better detected and deterred terrorist 
financing within the country and around the world.  
9.2.10 Effectiveness of China’s Effort towards CTF 
With the decision and the administrative measures in place since 2011 and 2014 respectively, 
China has increased their enforcement efforts to combat terrorism both in pace with the 
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terrorist’s sophistication and broaden network. According to the International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report Volume II – Money Laundering and Financial Crimes issued in 
March 2015 by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of 
United States Department of State, it has recognized China’s effort in various aspects. The 
report confirmed that China’s financial institutions have placed adequate instructions on 
Know-Your-Customer rules and enhanced due diligence procedures for the politically 
exposed person in the financial institution system. It also recognized China’s effort in early 
2013, where the People’s Bank of China has issued new regulations requesting China’s banks 
to “rate clients’ risks based on a variety of factors, including a client’s location of nature of 
business”, which was then in place by the end of 2014. (Bureau for International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs, United States Department of States, 2015) 
9.2.11 Risks of the Current Economic Policy towards Terrorism 
Recognized the continuous improvement of China in CFT and AML in meeting the 
international standard, there are still some areas being criticized by the international 
community. Though laws and regulations have been established, the issue remains is the 
implementation. The law enforcement in China has long been an issue. As explicitly stated 
by the US government, “although China’s courts are required by law to systematically 
confiscate criminal proceeds, enforcement is inconsistent and no legislation authorizes 
seizure or confiscation of substitute assets of equivalent value.” (Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, United States Department of States, 2015). On the 
other hand, though China is already integrating itself into the international regulatory 
framework and has become a member of FATF, there remains room for improvement in 
international cooperation. At the moment, China did not allow international law enforcement 
to investigate locally for suspicious international criminal organization as well as their money 
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transactions. Also, China has not cooperated in a sufficient manner on financial investigation 
and provide inadequate reply for financial investigation information. This has weakened the 
effectiveness of the global combat towards terrorism in a hard way. 
9.3 Socio-cultural  
As renowned war theorist Carl von Clausewitz said, “War is a mere continuation of policy by 
other means”. (Clausewitz, 1873) So war has a dominant political context. But it also has a 
social-cultural context that will affect the political context. (Gray, 2012)  
As some scholars of warfare studies point out, since the struggle in irregular warfare like 
terrorism or insurgency is “always about allegiance, or at least the acquiescence of people, 
the socio-cultural dimensions of strategy have to be treated with utmost care”. (Gray, 2012) 
Australian soldier-anthropologist David Kilcullen explained further (Kilcullen, 2009):  
Since the new threats are not state based, the basis for our approach should 
not be international relations (the study of how nation states interact in elite 
state-based frameworks) but rather anthropology (the study of social roles, 
groups, status, institutions, and relations within human population groups, 
often in non-elite, non-state based framework). 
Therefore this section will focus on the social-cultural aspects of existing counter-terrorism 
measures in China. Then the risks that may bring forwards will be assessed. And since 
Xinjiang is under the prime concern of the terrorist attacks in China, this section will mainly 
focus on the situation in Xinjiang.  
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9.3.1 Tight Control on Religious Activities 
Despite religious freedom is declared in its constitution, control on religious activities has 
been used by the Chinese government as a counter-terrorism measure since 1990s when 
terrorist attacks reached its highest level. (Pokalova, 2013)  Following the 9/11 attacks, 
Chinese government deployed a series of crackdowns to fight against three evils: separatism, 
extremism and terrorism. Western scholar analysed that it was due to the Chinese 
leadership’s fear that Xinjiang separatism had and would continue to gain support from 
transnational Muslim extremists. (Davis, 2008) According to the human right groups, the 
crackdowns included closing down “illegal religious centres”, arresting Muslims for illegal 
preaching and closing down local mosque. (Boehm, 2009)  
In 2005, Chinese government enacted the first comprehensive set of regulations on religion in 
the country, claiming that it constitutes a “significant step forward in the legal protection of 
Chinese citizens’ religious freedoms”. (Xinhua, 2004) (Regulations on Religious Affairs, 
2010) It not only emphasises all religious bodies and religious citizens shall safeguard 
unification of the country, but also lists out different regulations from limiting collective 
religious activities only be allowed at registered sites, to ensuring the religious bodies not 
subject any foreign dominance.   
However, since the riots in Urumqi in 2009 which led to nearly 200 people death, the 
Chinese government has further increased its regulations on Muslim practices. (Drennan, 
2015) These include: 
• prohibition of wearing veils by women and having beards by men;  
• women who insist on wearing face veil would not admitted for medical treatment; 
49 
• banning government employees, party member, teachers and school children from 
fasting during Ramadan;  
• banning government employees and children under 18 from attending mosques;  
• part-time schools teaching Quran at the mosques are prohibited  
(Grammaticas, 2013) (Farooq, 2014) (Gracie, 2015)  
The reports about Ramadan ban in China have recently turned into diplomatic and even 
security issues. Turkish Foreign Ministry issued statement to express its concern. 
Demonstrations with Chinese flags burning were held by Turkish nationalists in Istanbul. 
There were even reports of Korean tourists mistaken for being Chinese were attacked and 
hence Chinese government has issued warning travel warning. (Girit, 2015) The Chinese 
government denied the ban on Ramadan, saying that the accusation was “completely at odds 
with the facts” and exaggerated by the western media. But from the instructions posted on the 
websites of local governments and schools in Xinjiang, apparently there are bans 
implemented at local government level. (Ivan Watson and Steven Jiang, 2015) 
9.3.2 Focus on Economic Development & Education 
From the perspective of Chinese government, one of the push factors for people turning to 
separatism is poverty. (Cunningham, 2012) Hence by enhancing the economic development 
of the troubled areas, particularly Xinjiang and Tibet, it could help enhance stability and 
address the ethnic separatism or even terrorism. 
Since 1950s, the CPC instituted a policy of government-led internal migration policy, for the 
sake of economic development and increasing constituency loyal to Beijing in Xinjiang. 
(Pokalova, 2013) The military-civilian organisations Xinjiang Production and Construction 
Corps (PCC) were set up by the CPC in 1954 to assign the Han migrants to construction work 
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and facilitate the resettlement process. As a result, the Uyghur population has dropped nearly 
half from over 80% in 1945 to below 50% in 1980s, reaching 47.5% in 2013; while the Han 
population has increased from merely around 6% to 40% in 1980s, and then dropping a little 
bit to the latest 38.6%. (See Figure 3) 
Figure 3 Demographic profile change in Xinjiang over the years 
 
Sources:  
1945 & 1982 Data source: Chaudhuri, 2005. 
2003 Data source: http://www.china.org.cn/english/139389.htm  
2013 Data source: http://www.xjtj.gov.cn/sjcx/zgxj_3740/zgxj2013/201407/t20140722_429178.html  
The Chinese government has also spent billions of dollars on constructing infrastructure in 
the West, including the Qinghai-Tibet railway, the south-north water diversion, the west-to-
east power transmission, and highways connecting neighbouring Central Asian countries. In 
June, Chinese government announced that Xinjiang government was investing USD130 
billion to build infrastructures such as roads, highways and railways. (Wong, China Invests in 
Region Rich in Oil, Coal and Also Strife, 2014)  
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On the educational aspect, the Xinjiang government has shifted the language policy in the 
past several decades, claiming for better opportunities for ethnic minorities and integrating 
them into the greater China state. (Schluessel, 2007) It included the language standardization, 
making the Uyghur language and script closer to Chinese. Since 2002, the top university in 
Xinjiang originally founded as a bilingual education was forced to switch to all-Mandarin 
instruction. The government officials claimed it was needed for raising education standard. 
But the Uyghur groups criticized the change as a direct attack on their culture. (Language 
blow for China's Muslims, 2002)  
Actually better education as well as pushing forward bilingual education to improve people’s 
livelihoods has been part of Xi Jinping’s counter-terrorism policy. (Rajagopalan, 2014) When 
he visited Xinjiang last year, he emphasized funding for education must be expanded as 
education is essential to the region’s long term stability. He also highlighted the importance 
of bilingual education for minority children, not only to help them find jobs, but more 
importantly to contribute more to “national unity”. (Hong Z. , 2014) According to the recent 
foreign media report, there are ever more schools in Xinjiang moving towards using Chinese 
as the only medium of instruction, and Uyghur literature study is only limited to a few hours 
class per week. (Education in Xinjiang: Tongue-tied, 2015) 
9.3.3 Control of Political / Civil Participation 
If saying Chinese civilians enjoy limited political or civil rights, the rights that the ethnic 
minorities enjoying could be even less. Since the establishment of the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) in 1955, the Chinese government has been managing the 
selection and appointment of the local government leaders in Xinjiang: the secretary of the 
CPC Committee of the XUAR who is more a real decision-maker has been Han, while the 
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chairman of the local government who is more on policy implementation has been Uyghur. 
(Pokalova, 2013) It is considered as a way to consolidate the Han rule.   
And under the current political environment, the Chinese government tends to treat any 
criticisms or activism from the ethnic minorities as linked with separatism, or even terrorism. 
The arrest and life imprisonment of economics scholar Ilham Tohit for separatism one of the 
best example to illustrate the Chinese government’s hard stance on political dissidents, even 
it may just a moderate voice. (China jails prominent Uighur academic Ilham Tohti for life, 
2014) 
By the time of writing, nearly 200 lawyers and activists have been detained or questioned 
during a crackdown launched by public security bureau in this month. Thirteen lawyers and 
staff members at the Fengrui legal firm which represented Tohit and several other high 
profile clients have been charged with disrupting trial proceedings and violating court rules. 
(Stanway, 2015) 
9.3.4 Security: “Strike-hard” Campaigns 
The Chinese government had long been using the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to put 
down armed resistance or protests in Xinjiang since 1954. As the new waves of 
demonstration against Chinese rule came in 1990s in Xinjiang, the Chinese government 
decided to launch its first “Strike-hard” campaign in 1996 to crackdown protest activities in a 
systematic way, mainly targeting the “national separatists” and “illegal religious activities”. 
(Clarke, 2008) Despite of this, riot broke out in February 1997, with over 1,000 people 
involved in demonstration lasting for two days in Yining, resulting 10 deaths and over 100 
injured. This led to government step up the crackdown further. (Pokalova, 2013) 
53 
After the 9/11 attacks and the deadly riots in Urumqi in 2009, the Chinese government again 
deployed several waves of strike-hard campaigns. The one in 2009 went as strict as enforcing 
curfew, blocking internet and social media and disenabling mobile phone messaging. 
Checkpoints were set up around the city, with over 700 people being interrogated or detained. 
(Pokalova, 2013) 
The most recent one came after the increase in number of terrorist incidents in 2013 and 2014.  
Xi Jinping launched a one-year-long crackdown in Xinjiang after visiting there, emphasizing 
“strike-first approach against terrorism”. It is reported that 181 “violent terror gangs” across 
the country were cracked down, and scores of people have been sentenced to death, with 
hundreds being jailed or detained on terror-related offences. (Agence France-Presse, 2015)  
And the crackdown has further extended to areas outside Xinjiang since mid-June this year. 
In Shenyang, it is reported that police killed three knife-wielding “terrorists” from Xinjiang 
and injured one who attacked officers when the police visited their house. The authorities 
said they have already arrested 16 people before this attack took place. (Agence France-
Presse, 2015) 
9.3.5 Reframe Separatism into Global Terrorism 
Separatism is not new in Xinjiang. The Uyghurs’ first assertion for independence can be 
dated back to 1865 when Yaqub Beg, a military officer established a Muslim state in 
Kashgaria which lasted for about 12 years. (Cunningham, 2012) Then throughout the first 
half of 20th century, Uyghur separatists had several attempts to establish an independent state, 
such as an “East Turkistan Islamic State” in Kashgar in 1933 but collapsed within three 
months, and the East Turkistan Republic in Yining in 1945 with the help of Soviet, which 
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only lasted for five years. During the Maoist era, Xinjiang also experienced intensive unrest. 
Then 1990s came another wave of ethnically-motivated violence in Xinjiang.  
As scholar points out, terrorism was actually one of the tactics used by Uyghur separatists. 
(Pokalova, 2013) So the Chinese government has long been dealing with domestic terrorism, 
before the 9/11 attacks. China’s cooperation with neighbour countries such as Russia and 
Central Asian countries even started as early as 1996 when Shanghai Five, the former SCO, 
began meeting. (Mackerras, 2007) But at that time, China described the separatist movements 
as “splittist”. (Fishman, 2011) In its first and second National Defense White Papers in 1998 
and 2000, they asserted that terrorist activities were a new form of danger and a threat to 
international security. But neither of them went into details, with the word “terrorism” being 
used once. (Paul J. Bolt, Su Changhe, Robin L. Bowman, and Daivd H. Sacko, 2008) 
However, the turning point is the 9/11 attacks. Though the perpetrators behind the violence 
happened before in Xinjiang remained largely unknown, the Chinese government published a 
statement retrospectively claimed that they were done by East Turkistan terrorists. 
(Information Office of State Council, 2002) It asserted that the ETIM has linkage with al-
Qaeda, “supported and directed by bin Laden”. Its White Paper in 2002 also gave a wide 
coverage on international counter-terrorism cooperation, and asserted that China was also a 
victim of international terrorism, especially from East Turkistan terrorist activities. (Paul J. 
Bolt, Su Changhe, Robin L. Bowman, and Daivd H. Sacko, 2008) 
By monopolizing the discourse on the Xinjiang violence through the authoritarian control on 
state media, China portrayed not only domestically but also internationally that Uyghur issue 
linked with global terrorism. It sought support from US for its allegation on ETIM and other 
Uyghur separatist groups, calling on foreign government to outlaw four groups that it 
55 
designated as terrorist organisations. In 2002, the US designated the ETIM as a terrorist 
group under Executive Order 13224 to block financial transactions with groups linked to 
terrorism, and put the ETIM under the US Terrorists Exclusion List which allows the US to 
prevent individuals linked with terrorist organisations from entering the US. But it is worth to 
note the ETIM is not listed as a terrorist group on the US’s main list of Foreign Terrorist 
Organisations. (Q&A: East Turkestan Islamic Movement, 2013) Upon request from the US 
and China, the UN also designated the ETIM as being associated with al-Qaeda on the one 
year anniversary of 9/11 attacks. (Cunningham, 2012) (QDe.088 Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement) While the US emphasized the designation was “not a concession to the PRC, but 
based on independent evidence that ETIM is linked to al-Qaeda and has engaged in deliberate 
acts of violence against unarmed civilians”, some observers argue that it is more a 
reciprocation for China’s support on US’s War on Global Terrorism and strike in Afghanistan. 
(Cunningham, 2012) (Dynon, China's "War on Terror" in Xinjiang, 2013) 
Moreover, different scholars and analysts have challenged that the information about the 
origin, goals, developments and activities of the ETIM remain limited, except those provided 
by the Chinese government. (Cunningham, 2012) (Clarke, 2008) Hence it was difficult to 
conclude a “clear and significant” linkage between the group and the broader terrorist 
networks such as al-Qaeda or Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), at least based on the 
information available at that time. (Clarke, 2008) Having said that, more evidence came in 
over the past several years suggesting that more meaningful relations among ETIM and other 
regional terrorist organisations may have developed. This will discuss more in the next 
section about the risks.  
Besides, there is little evidence showing that the ambitions and objectives of Uyghurs are 
consistent with those of Islamic jihadist groups. But rather, there were more cases showing 
56 
that the Uyghur separatists were motivated by nationalist or separatist desires. (Cunningham, 
2012)  
For an instance, the 22 Uyghurs captured by US military forces in Afghanistan and detained 
at Guantanamo Bay did not hold Islamic fundamentalist views. But rather they admitted to 
fighting for “East Turkistan’s independence” and emphasized repression or persecution in 
China as their primary motivation for being in Afghanistan. (Cunningham, 2012) The 
detainees’ testimonies also suggested that most of them had not heard of ETIM before, and 
received minimal “training” with small arms, with little or no assistance from al-Qaeda or the 
Taliban. (Clarke, 2008)  
Hence many scholars assert that the 9/11 attacks actually gave an opportunity for China to 
reframe its position on Uyghur separatism and terrorism into international terrorism, linking 
with al-Qaeda. (Potter, 2013) (Pokalova, 2013) (Mackerras, 2007) By reframing its own fight 
against separatist violence under the context of Global War on Terrorism, the Chinese 
government could leverage the US’s fight on terrorism policy to justify their strike-hard 
policy in Xinjiang and other restive areas in China and avoid being criticised as violating 
human rights. (Potter, 2013)  
Under the Xi Jinping administration, the ETIM is still regarded as the “the most immediate 
and realistic security threat” in China. And as Islamic State (IS) rises, Chinese officials and 
official media have further linked ETIM with IS. They claimed that members from ETIM are 
fighting alongside with IS in Syria and Iraq, posting concern on the security and effect in 
Xijiang. (Martina, About 300 Chinese said fighting alongside Islamic State in Middle East, 
2014) 
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9.3.6 Risks Analysis: on Socio-cultural Front 
9.3.6.1 Creating conditions for emergence of terrorism 
While the Chinese government has been emphasizing the importance of economic 
development in Xinjiang, it seems the Uyghurs have not enjoyed the benefit of the economic 
gain. A quantitative study of Uyghur-Han Chinese earnings differentials shows that overall 
Uyghurs earn 31% less than Han Chinese in Urumqi, providing evidence to the long-term 
criticism of ethnic economic disparities in the region. (Zang, 2011)  
Besides, the tight control on religious practices and educations, as well as change in language 
policy, all has given rise to the discontent among the Uyghurs against Hans rule. As Pokalova 
points out, these actually have created conditions for emergence of terrorism. And the trend 
of number of incidents of Uyghur terrorism in Xinjiang reflected the patterns of state 
repression in the region. (Pokalova, 2013) One may argue it is more a chicken and egg 
problem that difficult to tell which one is the cause. But it is clear that it can easily turn into a 
vicious cycle of reprisals that the violence never ends.  
Moreover, while there is no definite conclusion on relationship between regime type and 
terrorism, scholars argue that terrorism can result from the lack of opportunity for political 
participation and constraints on expressing grievance. (Crenshaw, 1981) As the grievance 
among the Uyghurs grows up but left addressed, it can result in people resorting to violence 
to express their anti-Hans sentiments.  
The life imprisonment of Tohti, a peaceful critic of its policies in Xinjiang, also gives a bad 
signal that the Chinese government will not even tolerate even such a moderate opposition to 
its rule in Xinjiang, further limiting any opportunity for any dialogue between the Uyghur 
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communities and the authorities. Again, this will fuel the motivation to going for radical or 
violent acts to express grievance or discontent. 
9.3.6.2 Cross fertilization in terrorism hotbed areas 
A series of strike-hard crackdowns in Xinjiang intended to eradicate the radical groups. 
However in the past decade, it seems that these actions have radicalized the militant Uyghur 
separatist groups and forced them into neighbouring countries where there are hotbeds for 
terrorism.  
As argued by Pokalova and Potter, different information indicates that prior to 2001, the 
EITM’s founding leader denied any links or financial ties with al-Qaeda. Or at the very best, 
the ties only limited to some training and funding but “relatively little operational 
cooperation.” (Pokalova, 2013) (Potter, 2013) ETIM only became visibly active in China 
since 2008, ahead of the Olympic Games in Beijing, by declaring war on China for its 
occupation of their “homeland of East Turkestan, which is part of the Islamic World”. (Wong, 
Group Says Video Warns of Olympic Attack, 2008)  Scholars have observed that the group’s 
ideology has since then become more linking with al-Qaeda and international terrorist 
networks. (Pokalova, 2013)  
Also, information show that in recent years, the ETIM or TIP leaders has been more active in 
the tribal areas of Pakistan, from coordinating al-Qaeda forces and training camps, playing 
integral role in military planning to being mediator between rival Taliban factions. (Potter, 
2013) Besides, the latest ETIM leaders have no more denied linkage with al-Qaeda. Terrorist 
attack plot linking ETIM and al-Qaeda were found out in Oslo. (Pokalova, 2013)  
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Both Potter and Pokalova attributed these changes to the counter-effect of the high-pressure 
strike-hard campaigns by the Chinese government, radicalizing the ETIM or other separatist 
groups. It is argued that the crackdowns in Xinjiang, on top of the NATO war in Afghanistan, 
have forced these groups into those volatile countries, and hence has led to “cross-
fertilization” of them by building meaningful relationship with the major terrorist groups in 
the region. (Potter, 2013)  
Learning from this experience, when using or even intensifying the crackdowns currently, the 
Chinese government should not overlook risk of further ‘cross-fertilization” the Uyghur 
separatist groups with international terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda or even IS. 
9.3.6.3 Perceived as eroding Uyghur “identity” 
While emphasising the intention of changing language policy in Xinjiang and other ethnic 
minority areas is for better integration and more economic opportunities for the new 
generation, forcing the ethnic minorities to learn standard Chinese is perceived as the 
Chinese’s government repression on their culture and “identity”. 
As points out by some anthropologist scholars, language is central to ethnic identity. (Dwyer, 
2005) However, the orthographic policy and script changes, plus the internal migration of 
Han Chinese perceived as assimilation policy, have resulted in the Uyghur ethnic group 
defining and reinforcing their ethnic identity, increasingly in opposition to the Chinese.  
Many previous studies also have shown that, from the Uyghurs’ point of view, what more 
pertinent is the retention of “a collective identity by resisting Chinese rules as an act of the 
Uyghur nation”. Their perception about the threat is less related to the independence of the 
territory, but more about the extinction of their cultural survival. (Cunningham, 2012)  
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Similarly, though the Han Chinese has played a vital role in economic development in 
Xinjiang, they are often perceived as an agent of reinforcing colonial rule. No matter the 
government-led internal migration of Han Chinese, or the Han Chinese dominance in good 
jobs and high profit return industries like oil companies, all these are perceived as the 
monopoly of the economic gains from the local natural resource, or accumulating wealth by 
exploiting the ethnic minorities.    
Hence the harder the Chinese government to enforce these policies, the stronger discontent 
and mistrust towards Han Chinese would build up among the Uyghurs. 
9.3.6.4 Linking China-Uyghur confrontation to jihadis 
Reframing Uyghur separatism into global terrorism has some definite drawbacks. First of all, 
it can easily put the all the jihadis around the world to be in confrontation with China, rather 
than only the radical separatists in Xinjiang. No matter the criticism on China’s repression 
against Uyghur Muslims is valid or it is just a matter of perception, it still can draw jihadi’ 
attention to the issue who then can use it as an excuse to garner wider sympathy among 
Muslim populations around the world, and aid their recruitment.  
In recent years, some prominent jihadi leaders’ have started to criticise or even threaten for 
more attacks as retaliation for the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. For an instance, 
following the Urumqi clashes in 2009, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) threatened 
to target Chinese nationals and projects in Algeria in retaliation for what China did against 
Uyghur Muslims. (Potter, 2013) The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) also declared war on 
China’s overseas interests in reprisal for the Uyghur crackdown. (Charles Horner and Eric 
Brown, 2010) In 2014, following the mass stabbing at railway station in Kunming, Abdullah 
Mansour, TIP leader described “the fight against Chinese” as his “Islamic responsibility”, 
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saying “China is not only our enemy, but it is the enemy of all Muslims”. (Saud Mehsud and 
Maria Golovnina, 2014) 
Secondly, as some analysts point out, discussing the China’s rise is not limited to western 
politicians or geopolitics analysts. Al-Qaeda affiliated jihadi thinkers have also been debating 
the same topic, from how best to support the Uyghur Muslim cause to question who will be 
their enemy in future as the US facing more competition from China. (Fishman, 2011) Some 
jihadis, such as Akram Hijazi, have proposed that China may replace the US as the world’s 
“head of the snake”. Thus China’s linking Uyghur violence to global terrorism would just fit 
in this logic perfectly and help justified the idea that China is an evil against Muslims. As 
China’s economic interests around the world has grown substantially, the risk that ideology-
motivated jihadis attack China’s overseas infrastructures or nationals will be higher. 
(Fishman, 2011)  
Some other scholars also propose that the China’s rhetoric of framing the Uyghur unrest to 
global terrorism, plus its strike-hard crackdown which enhances the cross-fertilization of the 
groups in hotspots for jihadist groups, actually contributed to the radicalization of the Uyghur 
separatist groups. (Potter, 2013) No matter this was the original intention of the Chinese 
government or out of its expectation, the consequence is it would be even more difficult to 
eradicate these groups now.  
9.4 Technological 
Technological advances possibly affect the patterns of terrorism in the civilian domain and 
counter-terrorism in military aspect. It is especially important as the terrorist activities 
nowadays are conducted with advanced technologies. The ecology of terrorism is closely 
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related to technological breakthroughs, which provide new forms of weapons, 
communication channels, targets and expected audience of their activities.  
9.4.1 Technology Impact on Terrorism Development 
9.4.1.1 Information and communications technologies (ICT) helps aspiring terrorists 
Before extremists or terrorists plan any attacks or destructive activities, information 
technologies have already played a role in the formation of the group. Given the convenience 
to use internet and mobile communications, people can easily obtain information from and be 
inspired by some extremist groups despite the geographical distance. Terrorist groups can 
also disseminate propaganda and training materials through websites and social media to 
facilitate their expansion. Moreover, development of ICT allows training materials to be 
produced professionally and systematically, and disseminated quietly.  
9.4.1.2 Cyber terrorism 
Cyber terrorism refers to the use of computers or electronic devices to destruct or cause harm 
and fear for political motivation. Cyber terrorism can be defined as “the convergence of 
cyberspace and terrorism” and “an unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, 
networks and the information stored therein that are carried out to intimidate or coerce a 
country’s government or citizens in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (Denning, 
2000). Cyber attacks include hacking, spreading of virus, interrupting website services etc. 
Compared to hostage executions or deadly car bombs, cyber attacks in general rarely get 
much attention since they are not visible. Nevertheless, given the increasing importance of 
cyber space to the international community, cyber attacks are getting more destructive and 
can possibly be used by terrorists who aim at spreading fear.  
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9.4.1.3 New interactive mass media technologies 
New forms of interactive mass media or instant message applications such as Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube allow terrorists to get the international media’s as well as individuals’ 
attentions, encouraging more dramatic forms of terrorist attacks. Due to the open and 
efficient way of communications, the new forms of media also allow terrorist groups to 
bypass censorship and communicate directly with audiences all over the world to a larger 
extent than before.  
9.4.1.4 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
As the terrorist groups’ target to catch the public’s attention and create chaos, they may even 
make use of WMD to kill as many people as possible. Advanced technologies and WMD 
such as chemical and biological weapons are more popular and easier for civilians to obtain 
nowadays. As for the nuclear weapons, according to the declassified documents available at 
the National Security Archive of the George Washington University, the US and other 
countries indeed have anticipated possible terrorist nuclear incident at important events. 
(Richelson, 2012) In this connection, the scale of destruction and lethality of terrorist attacks 
is probably getting more serious, although the frequency and the total number may not be 
growing, partly because of the use of WMD.  
9.4.2 Counter-terrorist Technologies 
Technology helps governments to significantly increase their counter-terrorist capabilities. 
Counter-terrorism technologies used by governmental organs include detection of explosive 
and chemo-biological weapons; mass surveillance technologies such as drones and CCTVs; 
biometrics such as finger-print, facial, voice, iris recognition as well as sensor technologies 
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etc. Efforts to combat terrorists’ possession of nuclear weapons have also been made by some 
states by evaluating terrorist groups’ interest to obtain those weapons, and addressing the 
risks to the storage of nuclear-related materials. In the military aspect, technological 
developments may inadvertently provide terrorist groups with newer and more efficient 
weapons. Due to budget constraints, however, terrorists may use traditional or low-tech 
device, and even homemade hand weapons. (Lia, 2005) 
9.4.3 Technological Measures in Place and Risks Implied  
Advanced telecommunication and technologies enable people to exchange large amount of 
information across the continents, and spread their ideology with in an efficient way and low 
cost. Counter-terrorist technologies will definitely be one of the major strategies in combating 
terrorists. In China, there are almost 650 million Internet users, more than twice the number 
of people online in the US. The control of the use of Internet and new media has become an 
important strategy for the state leaders, not only to suppress opponents, but also to prevent 
terrorist groups’ development.  
9.4.3.1 China’s new rules to regulate technology firms 
The draft new counter-terrorism law in China strengthens the protection of information 
technology and use of Internet in the country. Article 15 of the new law states that internet 
service providers and operators, both domestic and foreign technology firms, to turn over 
encryption keys and passcodes that help protect data. They are also required to install security 
"backdoors" in their systems to grant the Chinese government access rights to computers and 
networks for security purpose. The firms are also required to save all user data within the 
Chinese jurisdiction. Meanwhile, Article 16 stipulates that the public security organs may 
require that service providers or users provide technical support for decryption, and use 
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telecommunications and Internet technical interfaces, for the purposes of preventing and 
investigating into activities related to terrorism. The proposed technology rules have raised 
concerns by western countries especially the US, whereas Obama criticized and urged 
Beijing to change the policy for continuous business relations with the US. 
In response, Chinese government officials emphasized that those measures are domestic issue. 
Fu Ying, the spokesperson for China's third session of the 12th National People's Congress, 
said that the technological measures of the new counter-terrorism law would only be used to 
prevent and investigate in cases related to terrorist activities, adding the information is 
restricted to government organs. (Xiang, 2015) As a matter of fact, Beijing is still 
technologically dependent on foreign companies despite the country’s efforts to enhance the 
technological capabilities in recent decades. While the counter-terrorism law is still being 
drafted, it will possibly be revised to address some Western concerns as China is reportedly 
pushing to eliminate foreign technology in key sectors by 2020. (Gady, The Real Intention 
Behind China's Extreme Counter-Terrorism Law, 2015) 
9.4.3.2 Exclude foreign technology firms in domestic market 
China plans to exclude some major foreign technology firms in response to the western cyber 
surveillance, according to a Reuters report. (Carsten, 2015) The country reportedly approved 
products locally made while some of the world's leading brands, such as Apple, Cisco, 
McAfee and Citrix Systems, were dropped from the Central Government Procurement 
Center's approved state purchases for financial institutions, military, state-owned enterprises 
and government agencies. Among all, Cisco Systems Inc counted 60 products on the list in 
2012, but none was left by late 2014. Local makers also accounted for the increased in the 
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number of approved products on the list, from 2,000 to almost 5,000 in two years, raising 
concern on China’s move to exclude foreign firms from the technology sector. (Carsten, 2015) 
Alternatively, China is pushing to reduce the dependency of financial institutions, state-
owned enterprises and key government agencies on foreign technology such as Microsoft 
Windows operating system and core servers. According to research firm IDC, China’s 
domestic information and technology market was roaring, with spending expected to be 
increased by 11% to more than $465 billion in 2015. It would be accounted for 43% of the 
growth in technology sector worldwide, according to IDC’s prediction. (Lohr, 2014)  In order 
to enhance the cybersecurity, National Petroleum Corp., the country’s largest energy 
producer, in late 2014 announced that it had swapped Microsoft Outlook with eYou, the 
domestically developed email software. Also, among the Chinese technology companies, 
Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corporation have already begun to gain local market share 
over the foreign competition, the Bloomberg Business noted. (China Said to Plan Sweeping 
Shift From Foreign Technology to Own, 2014) 
9.4.3.3 Internet and Social Media censorship  
In the information age, internet and telecommunications are very important to people’s daily 
lives. Terrorist groups can simply post videos online to make the information available to the 
world. According to the Annual Report on China’s National Security Studies, videos and 
audio channels have become the major channels for Xinjiang terrorists as well as other 
religious extremists to recruit members, “brain wash” the public, spread harmful information, 
and organise terror attacks. (Liu & Zhao, 2014) The government also believes that they 
collect funds and build connections online.  
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To address the issue, the State Internet Information Office (SIIO) issued new rules for social 
media such as QQ, wechat and microblogs in August 2014. It requires users to include real 
name when they register for the online platforms; they also have to agree on obeying the 
“bottom lines”, which include supporting the socialist system, enforcing social morality as 
well as authenticity of information. Without specific licences to issue news, public accounts 
are also banned to redistribute news and current issues. 
The Chinese government also terminates instant messaging whenever necessary. China has 
cut internet access during previous terrorist attacks in Xinjiang. In a knife attack with people 
killed was happened in July 2009, the authorities suspended Internet connections and instant 
message services immediately. The international direct dialling was also interrupted. 
Moreover, the Chinese authorities have been using the Great Firewall, a filtering system to 
block the citizens from viewing sensitive or harmful materials online. The Great Firewall was 
also upgraded to enhance the efficiency in blocking individuals and corporations from 
browsing the internet freely. Users are banned from popular western social media platforms 
such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. They also find difficulties in using Gmail and 
Google’s popular location service and search engine without using Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs). Furthermore, there are researches that said China has developed a powerful new 
weapon called the Great Cannon, which not only intercept transmission of website traffic 
from foreign countries to Chinese websites, but also inject malicious code to the website and 
redirect the traffic to fit Beijing’s purpose. (Perlroth, 2015) 
According to state media, the SIIO was set up in 2011, months after Xi Jinping became 
leader of the country. The office is responsible to oversee policies on Internet information, 
supervise and coordinate online content management. Online news reporting businesses need 
to obtain approval from the office, which also manages the registration of domain names, 
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websites and IP addresses, which affect the accessibility of Internet content. The office has 
effectively put tighter control over Interne usage within the country. The number of 
investigated terrorism-related videos has risen from 13 in 2011 to 109 last year, according to 
the office. (Zhang & Liu, 2014) 
9.4.3.4 Enhanced surveillance technology 
Beijing enhanced efforts to combat terrorism by stepping up surveillance to all possible 
members of the terrorist groups.  The Chinese government announced in April this year that 
the video security surveillance and counter-terror operations in public areas would be 
expanded. The Government would set up a national population database linked to ID 
information and credit records in order to fight terrorist attacks. According to state media, 
real identity registration was applicable to reservations and bookings for hotels, online 
second-hand trades, and unspecified “recreation services” etc. Such enhanced security 
measures are intended to establish a security network that protects the general public 
community. 
Furthermore, the restrictions are tightened in specific areas such as Xinjiang. Buyers of 
mobile phones or computers, both brand new and second-hand devices, have to register their 
personal information, which are made available by the Police, according to the state media. 
(Li, 2015) The measures reportedly aimed to “prevent people spreading harmful information 
and carrying out illegal activities”. Operators of electronics stores have to place warning 
signs in prominent locations to alert people not to spread multimedia files with violence and 
terrorism messages. 
On the other hand, regarding surveillance technology, China has pronounced drone fleets for 
the purpose of public surveillance. It also developed homemade anti-drone laser defense 
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system especially targeting small-scale, unmanned drones which can likely be used by 
terrorists. (Xinhua, China develops anti-drone laser, 2014) 
9.4.3.5 International cooperation  
In addition to internal policies, China has also entered into cooperation and dialogues with 
other states in areas of technology and online security. Among all, to address the concern of 
cyber terrorism and cyber espionage, the US and China have started formal discussions on 
cybersecurity since the summit between Obama and Xi Jinping in June 2013. A working 
group on cybersecurity was also set up to push forward counter cyber terrorism. Nevertheless, 
in May last year, the US indicted five members of the Chinese military for hacking. China 
pulled out of a cybersecurity working group following the charges. Thereafter, there is little 
progress on high-level communication in the issue. 
Separately, China and Russia signed a memorandum earlier this year, stipulating that the two 
countries would not conduct cyber-attacks against each other. They also agreed to join forces 
to discourage any technology that could potentially destabilize the public order or interfere 
with the internal affairs of a country. Greg Austin, a fellow at the EastWest Institute, 
commented that the memorandum could intensify bilateral and multilateral efforts to build up 
a code of conduct in cyberspace, and give pressures to other countries to develop diplomacy 
in cyber cooperation, although the agreement did not cover the use of all kinds of military 
cyber assets (Gady, Have China and Russia Agreed Not to Attack Each Other in Cyberspace?, 
2015) 
Cyber terrorism is literally the terrorist attacks in cyberspace. In this context, it is unlikely 
that the terrorists within China, i.e. the terrorists Xinjiang, would use such ways due to their 
lack of resources and technology. Instead, they usually attack with very simple weapons or 
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even self-explosion tools. Having said that, there is no definite boundary in cyber space, and 
terrorists from all over the world can attack and hack computer systems in China. In this 
connection, cooperation in cyber space is essential and necessary for China’s national 
interests. However, the bilateral relations and regional politics always affect the discussions 
and cooperation with other countries.  
9.4.4 Risks Identified from the Existing Measures 
9.4.4.1 Suppressive measures may trigger greater social unrest in the country  
China heavily censors the Internet and communications for the reason of counter-terrorism 
may result in great resistances. Lose of communication freedom will dissatisfy the citizens 
especially as the country is economically opening up to the world. People with higher 
education and more interaction with the rest of the world demand heavy usage of ICT. Hence 
the restriction in freedom of communications would inevitably upset the citizens, even 
though they do not speak up. The tightened censorship also results in accusation of violation 
of civil liberties and human rights from international society. On the other hand, this allows 
terrorists to make use of such dissatisfaction to motivate people to act against the authorities. 
Terrorists may also respond with extreme tactics amid the suppressive measures in place.  
9.4.4.2 Firewall may further isolate the cyber space in China 
The Chinese authorities use tools to block the Internet traffic in China with the rest of the 
world. Such approach means overseas content is heavily censored and the Chinese netizens 
are excessively protected. International technology companies locating their servers in China 
fall under the Chinese jurisdiction and regulations, which are deviated to the international 
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norms. The government’s rights to access computers and servers, and the strengthened 
firewall deepen the discrepancy between the information flow in China and the world. 
9.4.4.3 Forcing computer firms to open source hurts development of ICT industry in 
China  
Prior to developing businesses in China, foreign ICT firms have to agree on following the 
Chinese way of information technology, i.e. strict self-censorship and lack of privacy. 
Foreign investors of the technology sector have to bear the risks of possible interference by 
the Chinese government and lack of control over the management. They may be requested by 
the country’s security organs to hand in their consumers’ information, or at the risks of 
leaking clients’ secrets since the hosting servers of their company networks are located in 
China. After all, their concessions add the cost of doing business in China and discourage the 
development of the ICT industry in the country. 
9.4.4.4 International markets for Chinese technology firms diminished 
While Chinese Internet giants like Tencent and Alibaba are going global, Chinese ICT firms 
planning to expand internationally might be hard to gain trusts from the foreign consumers or 
governments because of security concerns related to the Chinese government access. Once 
they are accepted to enter into the host markets, there are risks of being censored by the 
Chinese government. Therefore, it would be more difficult for the Chinese ICT firms to 
expand to the international markets amid the concerns on Beijing’s surveillance. It is 
especially critical for China as the economy is slowing down, while Chinese policymakers 
are pursuing technology- and innovation-led development and an outgoing economic 
development strategy to maintain the economic growth.  
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9.4.4.5 Tensions to bilateral relationships with foreign countries affects progress  
The globalisation of technologies enables groups and individuals to access to tools and 
equipment previously limited to great powers. Terrorists’ tactics have been shifted to 
weapons of mass destructive to cyber-attack tools. To enhance cybersecurity, it is essential to 
establish dialogs with other countries for cooperation including exchange of intelligence and 
technologies. While China is cordoning itself off with the Great Firewall, cooperation in the 
cyber space with other major powers is limited. Accusation of cyber theft and spying for 
economic and military purposes also discourage partnership with other major powers.  
10 Policy Recommendations 
Similar as previous, PEST analysis is being used in illustrating recommendations to China’s 
counter-terrorism policy.  
10.1 Political 
The current situation of international politics and past participation in multilateral counter-
terrorism initiatives offer rooms and flexibility for China to formulate a detailed and targeted 
counter-terrorism strategy from political perspective.  Having reviewed the potential risks 
embedded on the existing practices, specific directions are found to be recommendable.  
10.1.1 More Substantial Involvement under the UN Framework and Innovation on Non-
interference Doctrine 
Expecting no fundamental changes to the structure of the UN in near future, China has to 
effectively utilise her role in the UN and the UN Security Council. This point is particularly 
essential against the backdrop that, China could not handle the issue of counter-terrorism by 
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itself without any joint efforts with other states due to the internationalisation of terrorism. 
Considering the unique nature of the UN and China’s existing veto power enjoyed in it, the 
UN is viewed to be a choice where China’s interest could be maximised when the state is to 
deepen the collaborations for counter-terrorism. Working through the UN platform, not only 
could support from member states be obtained officially, but also could legitimacy of 
overseas counter-terrorism initiatives be granted. Therefore, China should consider 
transforming the current diplomatic ways into actual actions including becoming a leading 
part of the UN military and security teams for counter-terrorism. This direction is at the same 
time in line with the trend of elevating participation levels and the general expectation on 
China as a major power. 
At the same time, to resolve the dilemma due to its doctrine of non-interference, China needs 
to have innovation on it. As some Chinese scholars suggested, different concepts like 
“creative involvement”, “constructive intervention” or “non-interference with conditional 
intervention” can be considered. (Wang, 2011) (Lu, 2012) (Pang, 2013) It is worth to note 
none of these concepts propose to abandon the non-interference principle, but to improve and 
extend the definition of it to better respond to the pressure from international community 
while addressing China’s fear of potential interference from the West on its internal affairs, 
such as Xinjiang and Tibet issues.  
10.1.2 Working with a Wide Range of States 
Furthermore, China should cooperate with a wide range of countries. Since the annexation of 
Crimea by Russia in 2014, some scholars and commentators are describing the conflicts 
between Russia and the Western countries as the “New Cold War”. China and Russia had 
long been political allies before the establishment of the SCO and hence China’s attitudes 
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towards military collaborations with Russia would unavoidably be read by strategic analysis. 
Therefore, for the purpose of maintaining the neutrality of military operations which is purely 
for counter-terrorism, China should adopt similar cooperation formats with both Russia and 
Western countries. As such, China could refute the claim that she is forming any military 
alliance which could further be transformed into a collective political threat to international 
community under the roof of counter-terrorism.  
10.1.3 Transparency is Needed 
In order to dismiss the conspiracy that China is trying to take advantage of her position in the 
international organisations such as the UN and the SCO so as to expand her own military 
power throughout the continents, it is crucial for China to increase the transparency of her 
deployment for overseas counter-terrorism operations.  Learning the lesson of how the US 
failed to gain popularity on her military actions by bypassing international institutions, China 
has to clearly indicate to the fellow states the justifiable purpose and the imminence of each 
overseas military operation to fight against terrorists. With more details disclosed to the 
international community, China could then gauge the sentiments before proceeding further 
with the operations and ultimately reputation could be retained. 
10.2 Economical 
Criticism on China’s CTF policy has urged China to improve in many ways, including the 
legal framework and various legislations. However, there are still rooms for improvement for 
China to combat terrorism from the economic perspective. 
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10.2.1 Law Enforcement 
As mentioned, the law enforcement in China has long been an issue. With that, the China 
government should make sure that all courts are alerted with the CFT and AML legal 
framework and legislation. This can be done by publicly issued the legislation, and issue the 
information about the implementation in a transparent manner for others to follow Another 
important aspect, on top of the transparent issue of legislation, is to implement the these 
mandatory laws in a uniform manner. All courts should use the same ruler in making 
judgement, and the legislation should provide the prosecutor standardized authority.  
10.2.2 International Cooperation 
As mentioned, China can cooperate with the international participates in a more active 
manner. Cooperation should be expanded to more parties in a deeper manner. One crucial 
step to recommend is to cooperate more in the investigation of abnormal financial activities. 
Instead of letting foreign parties to investigate in China, which has led to serious concern by 
the Chinese government, the Chinese government can provide more in-time and in-depth 
information upon request to facilitate the on-going investigation.  
10.3 Socio-cultural 
10.3.1 Address the Risk Factors on Social Level 
Undoubtedly, the most viable long-term solution to counter-terrorism would be to understand 
the cause of terrorism and then address the issues accordingly. According to Louise 
Richardson, the emergence of terrorism requires a “lethal triple cocktail” with three elements: 
a disaffected or alienated individual, an enabling society and a legitimizing ideology. 
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(Richardson, 2006) Among the three, it is the society that is most susceptible to influence by 
us.  And on the social level, risk factors such as poverty and inequality increase likelihood of 
terrorism to recruit supporters or terrorists. Hence these factors should be our attention to be 
focused at.   
While Xi Jinping has vowed to improve the livelihood and employment in Xinjiang which is 
the right direction, this should be put into action instead of simply chanting political slogans. 
As discussed above, there is still a big income gap between Uyghurs and Han Chinese in 
Xinjiang. Though there is evidence showing that the Chinese government has been trying to 
reduce ethnic inequalities by encouraging state sector to hire more Uyghurs with affirmative 
action, the policies have just achieved mixed or limited successes. (Zang, 2011) This is 
because Uyghur-Han Chinese income disparity is mainly due to labour market discrimination 
in the private sectors. Thus to achieve greater ethnic parity in the region in long run, the 
Chinese government should develop concrete policies or even by legislation to increase the 
cost of discrimination on employment in all sectors. 
And this boils down to one of the root causes of inequality – a deep-seated ethnic and racial 
prejudice at the contemporary Chinese society. As a scholar on Tibetan studies points out, 
there has been the existence of discrimination or even hostility towards Uyghurs, Tibetans 
and other ethnic minorities for long. (Tuttle, 2015) But the inability or unwillingness for 
Chinese government to face this problem will prevent it from easing the tension in unrest 
areas and hence pose a long-term threat to the stability of the country. 
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10.3.2 Mindset Change: for Long-term Stability and Security 
Similarly, political reform to allow more participation from different ethnic minorities can 
provide non-violent means to express their grievances and redress the issues. Again, this 
depends on whether the Chinese leaders’ willingness to push for it.  
It is understandable that the uphold of its sovereignty and territorial integrity is regarded as 
China’s national priority, and the Chinese leaders is still living in a fear that granting 
increased social or economic rights to ethnic minorities would create more demands for 
political right or even autonomy. However, the Chinese leaders need to change the mindset 
and think from a wider perspective. The long-term avoidance to handling the root cause of 
ethnic tension problem would eventually radicalize the people to turn to violence or even fuel 
terrorism recruits.  
As we can see from the recent development of IS or Boko Haram, radicalized Muslims 
around the world can be inspired by the ideology of terrorist organisations. And terrorists 
tend to identify themselves with the suffering of others, such as Uyghur Muslims. As 
discussed above, in recent years, more and more terrorists have criticized China’s policies 
against Uyghur Muslims. With its increasing global prominence, China – its economic 
interests as well as national overseas – is facing higher risk of being attacked than ever.  
It is worth to note that failure to protect its nationals and economic infrastructure and 
investments overseas could not only hamper China’s economic development but also put it 
under huge domestic pressure and criticism. In long term, this would also affect the 
government legitimacy and effectiveness in ruling. Therefore, the Chinese government needs 
to have a vision to face the ethnic inequality and political inclusiveness problems and address 
them for the long term goal of stability. 
78 
10.3.3 Strike a New Balance between National Security and Cultural Autonomy 
One the cultural front, the Chinese government has perceived that the cultural autonomy, 
such as minority language as medium of instruction in schools, leads to separatist activity and 
therefore is dangerous.   
However, as discussed above, what concern the Uyghurs most is the Chinese government’s 
suppression of its culture and Uyghur identity. Restrictions on their cultural expression such 
as the use of Uyghur language as medium of instruction in schools are seen as attack on their 
identity. 
Therefore, as Dwyer proposes, China can reposition the cultural policy as an indirect counter-
terrorism measure and strike a balance between national security and cultural autonomy. To 
enhance the barely left acceptance of Chinese rule in Xinjiang as well as in ethnic minority 
areas, it is advised to support moderate cultural expression so as to prevent linguistic 
radicalization. (Dwyer, 2005) 
10.3.4 Encourage a Moderate Alternative to Violence 
It is beyond doubt that coercive policies are required for the perpetrators of the violence. 
However, one should not forget that the achievable goal of counter-terrorism should be to 
stop the spread of Islamic militancy, as proposed by Richardson. So the focus of counter-
terrorism should not only focus on the actual perpetrators but rather on the potential recruits 
of the terrorist groups. (Richardson, 2006) Learning from US war on Iraq, the use of 
overwhelming force to capture or killing all the Islamic militants in fact generated more of 
them, radicalizing the whole generation of young jihadists.  
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Therefore the current wide-spread “strike-hard” campaigns used by the Chinese government 
would unavoidably create more resentment among the potential recruits or even local 
communities. To win the “hearts and minds” of them, it requires to engage with the 
grievances that breed the resentment as discussed above. 
Besides, it is important to engage the local community to support the counter-terrorism effort. 
Engaging with moderate opinion among terrorist communities and mobilizing and 
encouraging a moderate alternative to violence could be an effective approach. (Richardson, 
2006) However, the life imprisonment of the moderate critic Tohit definitely has a counter 
effect which would further increase the resentment among the Uyghur community. 
 
10.4 Technological 
10.4.1 Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation 
The cyber space can be treated as an ecosystem (Lieberthal, 2012), whereas a single country 
cannot solve all problems in cyber terrorism as cyber attacks can be initiated from local and 
overseas. Member states of the UN adopted “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy” in 2006, which pushed forward the international cooperation to counter-terrorism. 
(The United Nations, 2006) 
To act as a responsible major power in the world, China can follow the international 
consensus and enhance efforts in counter-terrorism in the cyber space while reserving the 
state’s security and people’s rights. China should further promote bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation to counter cyber terrorism, through intelligence exchange and signage of 
memorandum of understanding, to establish trusts with its counterparts. It is also a way for 
China to build up positive national image in the international community.  
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10.4.2 Review Surveillance Policy 
New forms of counter-terrorist technologies will undoubtedly enhance governments’ ability 
to combat disruptive operations planned by terrorists. In China, the political resistance to 
prevent these technologies from being integrated into the overall anti-terrorism strategy is 
relatively low; nevertheless, there are social-economic concerns on impact of the use of 
technologies for censorship. Among all, international community always criticizes China’s 
suppressive freedom of communications and civil liberties. The surveillance policy would 
also hurt the economic development of China as an emerging market.  
China should review and relief the Internet strategy and surveillance policy. The giant 
“Internet cage” in China effectively controls the information flow within the country in the 
past; but it will not last long as the country is opening up and the mobility of people increases. 
As the country targets to go global, the current Internet strategy is not sustainable. For 
terrorists, the lack of communication channel would only push them to use extreme tactics to 
raise social concerns. As the world’s major power, it is necessary for China to review the 
Internet policy and take responsible actions to address the social needs of information flow. 
(Liu & Zhao, 2014) 
11 The Way Forward 
From the warfare studies perspective, if terrorism is not handled well by the government, the 
official response will enable, or even trigger, the mobilization of the public and aid 
recruitment to the terrorists’ cause. If their cause prospers, terrorists will become insurgents, 
and if they further gain in strength, they can mutate into regular soldiers who can confront the 
forces of the state in an open battle. (Gray, 2012)  
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Putting this into China’s current situation may sound a bit exaggerating the risk. But in view 
of the rise of Islamic-based extremism, China has to be more sensitive and prudent to 
different religious sentiments and geopolitical dynamics around the world, not only limited to 
places where it has economic interests in. The demonstration against “Ramadan ban” in 
Turkey and the diplomatic tension between two countries thereafter have illustrated that 
China’s domestic policy linked with counter-terrorism could have repercussion on its foreign 
relations. And even worse it could flare up anti-Chinese sentiment in other countries, and 
hence posting threat on China’s interests and nationals overseas.  
China as an uprising great power and its overseas interests continues to extend, it will 
become an increasing target for terrorist attacks. Therefore it needs an integrated approach on 
handling counter-terrorism internally and externally. On international counter-terrorism 
cooperation, it needs more substantial involvement under the UN framework innovations to 
overcome the constraints due to the doctrine of non-interference. On domestic front, it needs 
political willingness and change in leadership’s mindset to tackle the root cause of separatism 
and ethnic issues. It also requires determination on law enforcement for counter-terrorist-
financing, and multilateral and bilateral cooperation with other countries to counter cyber 
terrorism.   
(19,805 words) 
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